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DLD-267        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 18-1876 
___________ 
 
ROGER WILSON, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; PITTSBURGH POLICE DEPARTMENT; CITY OF 
PITTSBURGH; STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(W.D. Pa. Civil Action No. 2-18-cv-00314) 
District Judge:  Honorable Nora Barry Fischer 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or  
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
July 12, 2018 
Before:  JORDAN, SHWARTZ and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges  
 
(Opinion filed: July 20, 2018) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Roger Wilson, proceeding pro se, appeals an order of the United States District  
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania dismissing his complaint as frivolous 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).  We will summarily affirm the judgment of the 
District Court. 
 Wilson filed a complaint against the Pittsburgh Police Department and other 
defendants alleging that he tried to file a police report concerning an attorney who was 
stealing money from him for the last seven years and that the police refused to take the 
report.  Wilson also averred that he thinks the police took the report in 2011 or 2012 but 
refused to arrest the attorney.  Wilson brought claims pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1510, 
which prohibits obstruction of criminal investigations, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 for a 
violation of his equal rights.  He sought $50,000 in damages. 
 The District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation to 
dismiss the complaint as frivolous because it is based on indisputably meritless legal 
theories.  The Magistrate Judge explained that § 1510 does not give rise to a civil cause 
of action.  The Magistrate Judge also concluded that Wilson failed to allege facts 
supporting a violation of § 1981 and that allowing amendment of the complaint would be 
futile because Wilson’s claim is barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations.  
The Magistrate Judge noted that individuals do not have a right to the prosecution of each 
other.  The District Court overruled Wilson’s objections to the report in which he 
challenged, among other things, the procedures that were used and the conclusion that his 
complaint is time-barred.  This appeal followed.   
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our standard of review is 
plenary.  Roman v. Jeffes, 904 F.2d 192, 194 (3d Cir. 1990).   
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 The District Court’s decision is supported by the record.  Wilson has not shown 
that improper procedures were used in his case.  See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) (authorizing 
recommendations by a Magistrate Judge).  We agree with the District Court that § 1510 
does not provide for a private cause of action.  Cf. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 
1855-56 (2017) (courts will not create a private cause of action where a statute does not 
itself so provide); Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 
511 U.S. 164, 190 (1994) (noting reluctance to infer a private right of action from a 
criminal prohibition alone).   
 We also agree with the District Court that Wilson failed to allege facts supporting 
a claim under § 1981 and that allowing amendment of the complaint would be futile.  To 
the extent Wilson contends that the police refused to take his report, but then took the 
report in 2011 or 2012 and refused to arrest the attorney, such a claim is time-barred on 
the face of the complaint.1  Wilson states in his objections that he has been “trying to 
press charges non-stop since 2011,” but this assertion is insufficient to show that he has a 
timely, colorable claim for intentional racial discrimination under § 1981.  His complaint 
was properly dismissed.  See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).  
 Because this appeal does not present a substantial question, we will summarily 
affirm the judgment of the District Court.2 
                                              
1We need not decide whether Wilson’s § 1981 claim is subject to a two or four-
year limitations period, see Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369, 382-83 
(2004), because Wilson’s claim is time-barred even under the longer period. 
 
2 The motion for summary affirmance filed by the United States is granted; its 
request to stay the briefing schedule is denied as moot. 
